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1 Introduction
There is no longer any doubt about the role of external development financial assistance
in the economic performance of recipient countries where such assistance is undertaken
in a conducive economic policy environment (World Bank 1998).1 Development
assistance, focusing on investment projects in infrastructure, agriculture, industry and
the social sectors, has been found to be very effective in reducing the scourge of poverty
by enhancing economic growth particularly in poor nations. However, in recent times,
aid flows particularly to developing countries have been weighed down by a number of
problems, prominent among which are the limited availability and too much
concentration in a few recipient countries. The increasing scarcity of development
finance has now become generally accepted as the most critical development problem
that many low income countries face. Although foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to
developing countries actually witnessed a phenomenal increase in the 1990s, what is
evident is that these large private flows are highly concentrated in a few middle-income
developing countries.
The fact that domestic resource mobilization is needed for national economic
development has never been in doubt. An enabling domestic environment is vital not
only in mobilizing domestic resources, but also in attracting and effectively utilizing
foreign investment. Good governance, well-managed public finances, a dynamic private
sector, access to finance by all segments of the population, including small- and
medium-scale enterprises (SMEs), and adequate skills are undeniably components of
the domestic resource environment that should foster resource mobilization. However,
even when countries have made substantial progress in these institutional and policy
areas, the need for external domestic flows to supplement national efforts remains
indispensable. Although many low-income countries have begun to improve domestic
resource mobilization efforts, this by itself cannot realistically be expected to yield
amounts approaching the level of resources required to sustain, let alone, accelerate the
required rates of growth in these countries. In particular, long term investment flows are
essential in complementing the national development efforts of developing countries in
such areas as the consolidation of infrastructure development, technology transfer,
deepening productive linkages and boosting competitiveness. A large majority of
developing countries with low incomes and limited export earnings still need
concessional flows to supplement their domestic capital accumulation and to sustain
their development efforts.
The origin of the flow of finance to developing countries can be seen as part of the
evolution of the international financial system. One issue that emerged very clearly
immediately after the great depression of the 1930s and again after the Second World
War is the role of coordination and cooperation among countries on financial and trade
matters to ensure full employment, and to guarantee prosperity, and economic growth.
The past 50 years have witnessed the evolution of development thinking and practice,
and emergence of a large number of institutions, organizations and agencies at all levels
in what is now popularly referred to as the international financial system. Bestriding this
                                                
1 A recent study by the World Bank agrees that aid positively affects economic growth, and reduces
poverty, only when it flows to countries with stable macroeconomic environments, open trade
regimes, protected property rights as well as efficient public institutions that can deliver education,
health and other public services. The issue however is how to  attain these lofty policies.2
broad field of international development and the international financial system is the
colossus of development finance. Located in this intersection are international and
regional organizations such as the UN agencies, bilateral assistance agencies, private
foundations, the Bretton Woods institutions and a myriad of multilateral development
banks. And as should be expected, with the plunge in development finance, most of the
flak on multilateral finance, particularly in the past decade, has fallen on these
institutions.
Thus, there has emerged a clarion call on the restructuring of these institutions if
development financing which has played such an important role in moving the world to
the frontiers of growth is to be sustained. Although it has been recognized for some time
that there is need for a reform of the international financial system to cater to the
development assistance needs of developing countries, it was the 1997 Asian financial
crisis that spawned the debate on the weakness of the international financial system and
created a frantic search for remedies. To situate the debate within the ambit of the
present work, a distinction ought to be made here. It is generally recognized that there
are two different, though interrelated, demands on the services of global financial
institutions. The first demand is systemic in character and is associated with
macroeconomic and financial stability as a ‘global public good’ which generates
positive externalities for all international market participants (whether developed or
developing) and precludes negative externalities associated with contagion (Ocampo
2002). The debate centres mainly on problems caused by the volatility of short-term
capital flows, and, in particular, on ways, not only of managing crisis once they break
out, but also of anticipating and preventing them in the future.
The second demand stems from the recognition that the world economy is not a ‘level
playing field’ but is, in all practical ways, inundated with asymmetries which have a
mainly north-south coloration. The asymmetries are associated with differences in
financial development between developing and industrialized countries, and with
developing countries’ greater macroeconomic vulnerability to external shocks and their
limited means of coping with them (Ocampo 2002; ECLAC 2002). The overall effect of
this is that whereas developed countries have greater room for manoeuvres to adopt
counter-cyclical measures and elicit a stabilizing response from financial markets, the
opposite is the situation for developing economies. The high concentration of private
finance in a few developed and emerging market economies and the rationing of such to
low-income and many middle income countries are a further manifestation of these
asymmetries.
While it is widely recognized that both systemic stability and developmental issues are
crucial in the current debate and beneficial for developed and developing countries
alike, there can be no denying the fact that the debate has mostly failed to address the
most pressing problems that the low-income countries face, namely the availability of
development finance, especially long-term finance. To reiterate, the attempt here is not
to denigrate the systemic stability debate. For instance, while the Asian financial crisis
affected the entire world economy, its effects were much more mordant for
the developing economies as a whole than for the developed ones. Nevertheless, the
financial architecture debate has been too lop-sided tilting more as it were towards
the resolution of systemic crises and less on securing the flow of development finance to
the most needy regions of the world.3
Viewed from this perspective, this paper focuses more on the reform of the development
finance institutions to enable them discharge their development finance goal.2 It reviews
the lessons learnt from international experiences in development finance from the
particular perspective of developing economies whose growth and stability depend to a
large extent on the availability of long-term external finance. The paper is divided into
five main sections. Section 2 examines some of the dynamics underpinning
development aid and their implications for institutional reforms. Section 3 undertakes a
review of some of the major problems encountered under the present arrangement of aid
delivery. In section 4, various suggestions for reforming the financial system are
examined while section 5 recommends actions necessary at the country, regional and
international levels for reforming the system.
2 The dynamics of development aid
The basis for development assistance derives from its role in developing countries
where there is a paucity of savings.3 The end-use of development finance is as
multifarious as the delivery channels and as complex as the targeted programmes and
objectives. These could range from poverty reduction, women empowerment,
containing ethnic conflicts, protecting the environment, assisting refugees, to assisting
drought stricken communities and building local capacity in the recipient country, etc.
Because of the multiplicity of delivery channels, it is to be expected that performance
may sometimes fall below expectations.
The observed failure of development aid to promote economic growth particularly in the
1970s brought most aid programmes under severe criticism. The major criticism against
development assistance falls into three categories: those that consider aid harmful, those
that consider development assistance beneficial but inefficient, and those that consider it
appropriate only for the poorest countries.
The first group is the radical critique of developmental aid. This group argues that
development assistance is harmful and that it even encourages laziness on the part of
recipients. To this group, ‘aid is inherently bad, bad to the bone, and utterly beyond
reform’ (Hancock, 1989). The second group, instead, focuses on the inefficiencies that
have be-devilled the method of delivery of aid by international development institutions.
To this group, aid is not bad and could be made to work better if delivered through
appropriate channels and if targeted at countries that have put in place appropriate
domestic policies. The third group emphasizes the need to draw a line between those
activities that are essentially private sector oriented and those of a ‘public-goods
nature’. Multilateral development agencies, it is argued, should focus their operations on
those activities, which the private sector might not be willing to undertake. The review
of the performance of development finance institutions therefore focuses mainly on the
last two criticisms. By now, in spite of the dissension of a few radical scholars, it has
                                                
2 A number of suggestions have been made on how to reform the international financial architecture
and address financial crises in several countries. Measures to strengthen the financial system, promote
adherence to international standards of good practice etc are addressed in this paper only to the extent
that they may facilitate the flow of development finance.
3 The 2-gap model provides justification for foreign capital and their role in economic growth (Chenery
and Bruno 1962: Chenery and Strout 1966).4
become an accepted fact that aid works, but it could work better in promoting growth
and reducing poverty.
2.1 The internal dynamics of the aid process
Any attempt at better understanding some of the explanations that have been advanced
for the general ineffectiveness of development assistance should start from an
understanding of the internal dynamics driving the aid process. Some of the main
elements behind this internal dynamics include the conflict between the views of donors
and the objectives of recipients, commonly styled the politics of aid, and the ever
changing consensus on what constitutes ‘development’ (Kanbur et al. 1999).
Recipient countries need aid because in the face of volatile private capital flows and
underdeveloped domestic financial markets, aid becomes an indispensable source of
financing domestic development. Donors, besides the urge to promote economic
development, are also influenced by a variety of political interests such as the need to
maintain ‘normal’ relationships.
After the Second World War, the primary goal of development assistance was to spur
economic growth. The position has long changed. While growth is considered important
and continues to receive some emphasis, the focus of development assistance has grown
to encompass such issues as poverty alleviation and capabilities (the ability to partake in
the life of one’s community). In recent times, development is defined to include issues
like income inequality, protection of the environment, and the advancement of human
rights. Two problems have arisen from this changing view of development. First, as the
conception of development has changed, the strategy for achieving it has also changed.
Second and more important, it has also led to development assistance institutions and
donors dictating conditions that must exist in any recipient country to qualify for aid.
The interaction of the politics of aid and the lack of consensus on a development
strategy has led to two main end results. At the policy front, donors have continued to
use development assistance to influence recipients the way donors think right. One way
to do this is to attach conditions of policy reform to aid disbursement. Consequently,
recipients can hardly claim ownership of projects financed by donor agencies. At the
realm of projects, donors have pursued their individual institutional mandates and
interests through a breed of their own projects. The result, project proliferation and lack
of coordination. The issues raised here, conditionality, ownership, coordination and
concessionality are at the centre of the reform of the aid process, particularly the reform
of institutions. We briefly examine the issues here.4
2.2 Consequences of the internal dynamics of the aid process
2.2.1 Conditionality
Most aid programmes are conditional upon the implementation of certain policy
reforms. However, it is becoming increasingly accepted that the effectiveness of aid
                                                
4 The author assumes that these have been fully discussed elsewhere within the UNU/WIDER research
project. However a more detailed treatment can be found in Kanbur et al. (1999) and European
Commission (2002).5
requires a national commitment to the reform process. This implies that the
conditionality associated with adjustment lending is unlikely to stimulate reforms unless
it is in line with the recipient government’s own programme. Where such conditions
were considered inimical to the economies of some recipient countries, the reforms
were abandoned. Conditionality might be deemed irrelevant because it does not
correlate with policy reform or aid flows. Moreover, it comes at a cost to recipient
countries. Recipient countries that are already resource constrained end up spending a
greater part of their time satisfying the conditions stipulated by donors.
2.2.2 Ownership
The perceived failure of conditionality led to a new emphasis on ownership of the
reform process by the recipient countries’ government. The idea here is that the specific
conditions in recipient countries should be the main determinant of development
strategy, not the constantly shifting priorities of donors. When recipient countries know
that a project will serve their interests, they will want to own such a project. This is
germane to the success of any aid activity. The new orientation in development finance
aims at fostering recipient government's ownership of such programme.
2.2.3 Coordination and complementarity
Proliferation of aid and the lack of coordination have been major obstacles to aid
effectiveness. The myriad funding agencies in developing countries have their own
priorities and the current aid system provides all of them with outlets to pursue those
priorities. The end result in most cases is a duplication of functions and activities by
funding institutions. It also imposes a cost as the coordination, and monitoring of
projects occupy the time of staff in almost every recipient ministry in a country. The
inefficiency that arises from lack of donor coordination is an old, but still unresolved,
problem. Some attribute this lack of coordination to the recipients’ lack of absorptive
capacity, others to the different objectives that drive donor programmes and again
others to the multiplicity of aid agencies, each pursuing their own priorities.
2.2.4 Concessionality
There is an on-going discussion on increasing the share of development funding in the
form of grants rather than concessional loans, as a way to better target poverty reduction
and to prevent accumulation of unsustainable debt burdens. This has to do with the
development strategy issue and invariably the institutional framework for the delivery
of aid.
3 Institutional problems inherent in the current aid delivery systems
The major players in the current aid delivery system include the IMF, multilateral
development banks (MDBs), the UN agencies, the WTO, and the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS). The role of the BIS is more at the regulatory sphere and hence it will
not be addressed in this sturdy.
In assessing the institutions reviewed in this work, three criteria are used. The first is the
suitability criterion. In other words, given the functions that are enumerated, could these
functions not have been better performed by other institutions? Is there an overlap?
Second, what are the criteria that guide resource transfers and how suitable are these
criteria. Finally, how adequate are the types of lending?6
3.1 The multilateral development banks
3.1.1 Overview
MDBs are international financial institutions whose major shareholders include both
borrowing developing countries and donor developed countries. They are able to
mobilize resources from private capital markets and from official sources to make loans
to developing countries on better than market terms. In addition, they provide technical
assistance and advice for economic and social development and also provide a range of
complimentary services to developing countries. Their product lines include, long term
loans at below market rates of interest, concessional loans at very low rates of interest
and long repayment periods, guarantees to enhance private investment, equity financing
and direct lending to private sector operators, and relatively small amount of grant
financing mostly for technical assistance, training and capacity building in borrowing
countries.
A substantial part of net resource flows to developing countries is accounted for by the
major MDBs. This has varied between 5-20 per cent in the last 30 years (excluding
sub-regional institutions). MDBs have a large capacity to mobilize domestic and
international resources. This is to be expected, given their ability to generate value
added through policy dialogue, imposition of conditionality and offer of technical
assistance (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000).
Table 1
Financial indicators for selected multilateral development banks, 1998
 (US million dollars)
IBRD IFC CAF IADB AfDB AsDB EBRD EIB
Authorized capital assets 188,220 2,374 3,000 100,881 22,375 48,456 19,641 100,000
Assets 230,808 33,456 5,420 64,355 12,864 41,653 19,595 201,104
of which loans outstanding 113,688 6,241 4,059 37,385 9,026 24,698 4,917 87,974
Liabilities 202,787 28,112 3,997 52,582 9,039 31,590 14,523 181,479
of which borrowings 115,739 12429 869 39,553 7,582 23,744 12,562 337
Equity 28,021 5,334 1,423 11,774 3,825 10,063 5,072 19,624
Total liabilities and equity 230,808 33,456 5,420 64,355 12,864 41,653 19,595 201,104
Income expenses (a 9,642 1,506 375 3,194 759 1,833 376 9,364
Operating income 1,647 249 93 568 158 467 43 1,187
Retained earnings at the
beginning of the fiscal yr
16,733 2,998 440 4,156 1,572 6,496 134 11,577
Net income for the fiscal yr 1,518 246 93 568 142 464 43 1,967
Retained earnings at the end
of the fiscal yr
17,909 3,244 533 4,724 6,961 1,714 177 12,624
Note: (a Includes administrative expenses.
Source: Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000).
About 25 institutions constitute what is generally regarded as the multilateral
development bank system. The major actors consist of the World Bank; InterAmerican
Development Bank (IADB); Asian Development Bank (AsDB); African Development
Bank (AfDB); European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); European7
Investment Bank (EIB), and Andrea Finance Corporation (CAF) -Latin America and the
Caribbean.
The World Bank (WB) is the pioneer MDB; its activities date back to its establishment
in 1944. The WB is a complex organization consisting of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development IBRD, the International Development Agency, IDA,
the International Finance Corporation, IFC, the International Center for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency,
MIGA. The agency at birth was conceived to borrow funds and lend these to qualifying
governments for agreed projects at low interest rates for periods ranging between 10-20
years. Such loans were often made to governments of borrowing countries or public
sector institutions with government guarantee.
The IDA was established in 1960 as an aid agency with its activities confined to a group
of 60 countries mainly in Africa and South Asia whose classification falls into the least
developed countries (LDCs) category. IDA credits are long term (up to 40 years) and
contain a large grant component. The IFC came into being in 1956. It lends to private
sector institutions without any government guarantee. The ICSID, which was
established in 1966, was to function as an agent for the settlement of disputes arising
from investment decisions. In response to world demand for an investment guarantee
agency, the World Bank created MIGA in 1988.
3.1.2 The roles of MDBs
MDBs perform three main functions, namely, (i) financial resource mobilization;
(ii)  capacity building, institutional development and knowledge brokering, and
(iii) providing regional and global public goods.
The financial resource mobilization function is by far the most important, as it underlies
the other two functions. The basis for the existence of MDBs remains the provision of
loans to borrowing countries. At inception, MDB loans were concentrated on project,
programme and sector investment loans. With growth in the private investment, a
gradual shift away from such loans as in transport and energy, roads, irrigation, and
other traditional lending is envisaged. A number of MDBs are beginning to emphasize
social sector lending (education, health, family planning, disease control) and
institutional development in such fields as the reform of the civil service, judiciary and
the sale of erstwhile public enterprises. More controversial, however, are the MDB
loans for such purposes as redressing negative flows or volatility in private flows as
witnessed during the financial crises in Asia, Mexico and Russia in recent years. What
has also emerged as a major aspect of MDB resource mobilization function is the
mobilization of concessional finance for the poor countries through their soft loan
windows.
One area of MDB resource mobilization activities that is acquiring prominence is their
participation in debt reduction operations. In the 1980s initiatives such as the Brady
Plan and the IDA debt and debt servicing reduction strategy were essentially the
preserve of the World Bank and the IMF. In recent times, most MDBs debt reduction
involvement is being manifested in their role in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative. MDB role in the area of capacity building, institutional development
and knowledge brokering includes technical assistance, policy advice, training
programmes, and institution building by fostering consensus through dialogue and
knowledge brokering through the spread of best practices and dissemination of8
information. In recent times, emphasis is being placed on good governance as a
prerequisite for development. MDBs, accordingly, are being asked to help member
countries improve public accountability and participation, fight corruption, and
strengthen democratic processes. Other issues include private sector capabilities, the
strengthening of public sector management and building capabilities in local policy
analysis and project design.
MDBs are also becoming increasingly involved in the provision of public goods. They
provide information about the international economic situation and the economic and
social conditions in developing countries, conduct research on development issues,
publish data on major development indicators, coordinate development assistance where
possible and provide grants for disaster relief, agricultural research and training.
Another emerging public-goods role is their involvement in environmental issues. Other
MDBs’ public-goods functions include peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts, and
intervention to forestall health epidemics (e.g. HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa). The
involvement of MDBs in the avoidance of public bads such as money laundering,
corruption, human rights violation, drugs trafficking, and in recent times terrorism is
being seriously debated.
There is a lot of pressure generated in the performance of these three functions. First
there are tensions between the financing and development role of MDBs. As should be
expected, there are also tensions between the financing role and the public goods and
development role on the other hand. This raises a lot of questions on the division of
labour between MDBs and other agencies like the United Nations and other funding
agencies.
3.1.3 MDBs and other funding agencies
Given the diversity of its operations, one issue that has dogged MDBs since their
inception is the desirable division of labour with other agencies to avoid overlap and to
ensure coordination. First, the question is raised as to why MDBs should lend to sectors
in which private financing is available on ‘appropriate terms’.
The next issue has to do with division of labour between the MDBs, bilateral agencies,
and UN agencies. When there is no effective donor coordination, the costs to recipient
countries of aid in terms of meeting the demands of donors constitute a real threat to
already scarce resources. In the area of setting norms, establishing standards, and
providing policy advice, an appropriate division of labour would envisage a role for
other international financial institutions. The expectation is that when it comes to
dealing with trade and financial issues, the IMF, the WTO and other UN agencies like
the UNCTAD should have an edge over the MDBs.
One final point here is the division of labour between the MDBs themselves. This is
more in respect of the division of labour between the WB and other regional MDBs.
Where operations are on a larger scale transversing countries and regions such as of a
global public-goods nature, the WB is expected to be able to harness resources for such
projects. However, there are situations where operations may require a great deal of
knowledge of the local environment such as in judicial or public sector reforms. The
other MDBs are more at home with the latter.9
3.1.4 Justification of the role of the WB in development funding
Questions have been raised concerning the WB in two critical areas. First, is the role of
the WB to be a multilateral lending institution?, and second, is its function to be a
knowledge brokering institution. The increase in private vis-à-vis official flows to
developing countries on appropriate terms over the years has raised concerns about the
Bank’s continual involvement in this area.5 Private flows have increased substantially
over the years because of the increasing importance of private capital markets and
regional development banks in many developing countries. In 1995, private flows
accounted for almost 80 percent of total flows.
While this may be the case for middle-income countries, it is doubtful if the same can
be said for IDA countries, most of which have been bypassed by the surge in lending
observable in the 1990s and have continued to rely on the Bank. It is necessary to stress
here that the belief that the development financing needs of most developing countries,
including IDA countries, can be met by the normal working of the market system may
be misplaced. The observation that such flows are actually concentrated in a few
emerging markets and other middle income countries will continue to justify the
involvement of the WB in development lending at least in the immediate future.6
The argument in support of the knowledge function of the WB is based on its
public-goods nature. Critics have argued that the WB should leave development
research to universities and other private consultants who can do this well. Knowledge
has a public-goods character and when it comes to knowledge about best-practice
development, it is a public good and the provision should be done by a global institution
like the WB. Against the background of our discussion on information imperfection, it
will not be too farfetched to expect the Bank to provide technical skills as part of its aid
package by virtue of its development knowledge and experience. As the provider of
public goods, the lack of symmetry between a rapidly globalizing private sector and the
lack of private sector ownership of the externalities generated by the process of
globalization foists this responsibility on a global institution of the magnitude of the
WB. The gap between intentions and practice is wide in this area. The WB and, by
implication, the IMF as principal lenders have a tendency to use their research to justify
whatever their current prescriptions are in their lending programmes.
3.1.5 The World Bank and conditionality
The most widely held criticism of the WB’s aid delivery method is the issue of
conditionality. There are two opposite views on this. The WB is able to influence
government policies favourably because of its7 conditionality policy. The argument
here is rather circuitous. The WB, as a global multilateral development bank, has the
reputation of being able to borrow and repay its debt and also lend to other sovereign
                                                
5 See Summers (1999).
6 In a recent assessment, the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission set up by the US
Congress revealed that 70 per cent of the World Bank’s non-aid resources flow to 11 countries that
enjoy substantial access to private resource flows.10
Table 2
World Bank performance: failure rate of bank responsibilities
1990-93 1994-97 1998 99 1990-99
Project identification 12 % 18% 22% 16%
Project appraisal 33% 38% 38% 36%
Project supervision 24% 28% 24% 26%
Overall 38% 44% 43% 42%
Source: Meltzer (2000).
borrowers at slightly lower interest rates. But this ability to borrow derives from the
researched knowledge it has and hence its ability to device conditions on loans and
impose these conditions on its clients. Also, the WB has the ability to monitor loans and
projects and so ensure that contractual lending terms are honoured. This it assures by
imposing conditionalities, otherwise the returns from projects may not be enough to
induce further investment (Gilbert et al. 1996; Rodrik 1995; Mosley et al. 1995 and
Gilbert  et al. 1999). Thus the conditionality imposed is supposed to influence the
behaviour of governments and correct their failures.
The other view derives from the failure of the premise on which the Bank’s
conditionality argument rests—the belief that conditionality works in the direction
suggested. The ineffectiveness of conditionality is well documented (Killick 1998;
Mosley et al. 1995). Conditionality is besieged by a number of problems. There is the
fact that it results in time inconsistency. Most borrowing nations ex ante defer to
conditionalities as a means of obtaining much desired funding. Once the aid is
disbursed, the incentives fall away and countries may simply renege on the conditions
they agreed on ex post. Moreover, governments hardly own development policies when
conditionalities were imposed especially where these conflict with domestic realities.
The result is that such reforms are hardly successful as would have been the case, were
governments to willingly buy intro development projects. The overarching evidence
from many developing countries is that structural adjustment lending even when it
raises export performance, often results in lower investment growth and hence reduces
output. This finding casts aspersion on the WB emphasis on good policy environment
defined within the Bretton Woods framework as the fulfilment of conditionalities.
The other related issue is the project evaluation process of the WB. The process has
been rated low in terms of its credibility. It is befuddled by what has been described by
critics as ‘wrong criteria with poor timing’. WB projects are rated on three measures:
outcome, institutional development impact and sustainability. The issue of sustainability
is critical for developing countries but is weighted only 5 per cent in the overall
evaluation. Often results are measured at the moment of final disbursement of funds
whereas evaluation should be a repetitive process spread over many years, including
well after the final disbursement of funds when an operational history is available. This
again points to the lop-sided weight attached to countries’ ability to comply with
conditionalities, which is expected to be reflected in outcome and development impact.11
3.2 The International Monetary Fund, IMF
3.2.1 Historical background
The IMF was also established in 1944 as a response to the confusion that pervaded in
economic and financial arrangements immediately after the Second World War. Over
the years, it has undergone a lot of transformation in line with changing economic
circumstances. The move by many countries from a fixed exchange rate arrangement to
floating arrangements, the removal of exchange controls on both trade and capital
movements, the oil shocks of the 1970s, the debt crises and the Mexican response in the
early 1980s, the Asian crisis in the late 1970s, the events in the transition economies at
the end of the cold war and the response of the IMF to these events are some of the
factors that have shaped the IMF's evolving structure. They have also constituted the
basis for most of the criticisms that have been levelled against the institution.
3.2.2 IMF and the developing economies
The US commitment to keep the dollar price of gold at US$ 35 per ounce came to an
end in 1971. By August of the same year, the fixed but adjustable exchange rate
arrangement ended and by March 1973, major operators concluded that the fixed
exchange rate arrangement had gone for good. This also ended IMF’s central mission.
In the search for anew role, the IMF took on dealing with the financial and economic
problems confronting the developing countries. It provided advice to developing
countries in the area of fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies, which it
considered conducive to stable balance of payments conditions. In the process, it offered
loans to countries that took its advice.
The IMF took on yet greater responsibilities in the 1980s and early 1990s with the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the need to finance new financial restructuring in line
with free market arrangements and sponsor mass privatizations. This new function saw
a shift in IMF focus as a short-term lender to support balance of payments adjustment to
a source of long-term conditional lending, offering in the process macroeconomic
advice to developing and transition economies. This led to a remarkable increase in the
number of long-term commitments of the IMF and a major shift in its existing role. This
has, in turn, created a situation where poorer countries, particularly in Africa, have
come to rely on the IMF as a source of long-term lending and have become increasingly
dependent on the IMF. The consequence is that the IMF, since it has to grant such loans
on the satisfaction of a specific set of conditions, now exercises an unprecedented
influence on the national sovereignty of these countries. Worse still, some of these
programmes have not ensured economic progress. The IMF’s intervention in the
Mexican crisis (1994-95), the East Asian crisis (1997-98), and the Russian crisis (1998-
99) has evoked a number of criticisms.7 While the IMF can point to some successes, the
general view is that given the vast resources at its command, it has not been particularly
effective at maintaining financial and economic stability.
                                                
7 For an outline of these, see the Meltzer Report (1999: 17-21).12
3.2.3 IMF and development assistance8
The criticisms against the IMF are multifaceted but attempts are made in this section to
highlight those that are strictly related to development assistance in developing
countries.
i)  The lending role of the IMF and the use of conditionalities: A major criticism
of the IMF is that it wields too much power over the economic policies of the
developing countries. It is accused of using its vast resources and
conditionality to control the economies of developing nations, often
undermining the sovereignty and democratic process of member governments.
The IMF is not accountable to the public in developing countries and this has
also created the problem of ownership of its stabilisation programmes. The
executive arms of government in many developing countries have been
accused of using IMF requirements to extort concessions from the legislative
arm. It is feared that this may shift the balance of power within countries and
distort the fledging democratic institutions in place in some of these
economies. The IMF, it is argued, depends too much on mandates and
conditional lending imported from abroad and less on local decisionmaking or
incentives to encourage this.
ii)  It is also highly contestable if IMF interventions, whether long-term or
short-term, have been effective in bringing about the desirable results in
income or wealth increases.
iii)  The mission of the IMF has expanded considerably that it now overlaps and
sometimes conflicts with other financial institutions. Recently, while the
debate on its role is still raging, the IMF expanded its mission to include the
promotion of capital account liberalization (1998), poverty reduction (poverty
reduction and growth facility 1999) and the offer of immediate access to
financing during a liquidity crisis to members. Specifically, with the poverty
reduction and growth facility, the IMF will be responsible for monitoring and
setting conditions for almost all aspects of the borrowing countries’ economic
and social policies. This facility duplicates the functions of the WB and it is
doubtful if the IMF has the necessary facilities in this area.
iv)  Even as an institution designed to provide liquidity during crisis, the IMF
cannot claim to have been very effective in the past. The mode of lending
during crisis that involves protracted negotiations for the disbursement of
staged releases over a long period of time may not be an effective strategy for
responding to sudden liquidity crises.
v)  The IMF has also been accused of creating disincentives for debt resolution
when it lends to insolvent sovereign borrowers.
vi)  Finally, the IMF’s governance structure does not make for proper
accountability and limits its ability to pursue solely economic objectives.
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3.3 The United Nations agencies
The United Nations system is composed of a wide range of activities from
peacekeeping, human rights and disarmament (UN), through social development
(UNICEF), health (WHO), labour (ILO), refugees (UNHCR), food or famine prevention
(WFP), to technical assistance (UNDP) and trade (UNCTAD), and many others. Like
the WB and IMF, it was a post-Second World War creation designed to ensure world
peace and security and promote even development. The evolution of the UN in the last
half-century has been strongly influenced by two main factors or divides. The east-west
divide which was responsible for the cold war greatly limited the UN’s ability to
perform its political role, the maintenance of peace and security and the north-south
divide which hindered the UN from the performance of its function of promoting
development. The east-west divide gradually petered out with the end of the cold war
and this has left the UN system more in the arena of building consensus on
development. This is not to say that skirmishes of intra-regional conflicts do not still
abound but the ogre of an east-west conflagration that hung over the world from the
1960s to the late 1980s seems to have simmered over.
The need to cooperate and co-exist within established international arrangements has
been stressed in a number of literature (Kapur 2002; Nayyar 2002; Martens and Paul
1998) and it needs not to be rehashed here. Simply put, international institutions such as
the UN are mechanisms for transnational cooperation and collective action.
Institutionalization serves to anchor international cooperation. Such institutional
arrangements help to lower transaction costs of members and produce information
linkages across issues and they serve as agents that both create and diffuse ideas, norms
and expectations. They need to be able to operate sometimes very complex
organizational structures and administrative apparatus to provide a forum where durable
negotiations can take place and where members can interact. Secretariats are needed
where consultative and supportive services are provided for members. It is at such
institutions that decisions are taken to help shape understanding and mediate member
disputes.
3.3.1 Financing the development activities of the UN agencies
At the centre of the north-south debate has been the issue of financing agreed plans of
actions reached at major UN conferences. The unwillingness of the north to provide the
type of development financing envisaged by the UN is not unconnected with the
perceived improvement in the role of private investment, especially after the 1980s.
However, it must be universally acknowledged that private investment, whose main
motive is profit, cannot substitute for the financing of public goods and bads. Public
investment will continue to be needed, especially in areas where private investment will
not be attractive enough.
This trend is going to worsen as the pace of globalization proceeds. Globalization is a
market driven process and like any other market driven activity, it may reinforce or
accentuate exclusion. Those excluded either for lack of assets or capabilities may find it
increasingly difficult to get rehabilitation because of the dwindling power of the state, a
situation that has worsened with increasing integration and internationalization. In the
past, national governments intervened through economic policies to take care of the
interests of those excluded. In the evolving international context, this role of
government is being emasculated (Nayyar 2002).14
It is a fact that even as globalization and internationalization have moved unimpeded,
the development of the global institutions of governance has not kept pace. There has,
therefore, emerged an institutional gap. The present focus of the IMF and WB are very
restrictive. The UN will always be needed in war-torn countries, in crisis ridden
economies and in the development of democratic institutions, especially in developing
countries. There will remain the need to protect the global commons, deal with currency
crises as they occur, foster sustainable patterns of consumption and production and
prevent inter-state or international conflicts. Challenges of this magnitude will require
concerted intergovernmental efforts and massive financial resources.
Two issues are of relevance to us here. The first is that it is not very clear if the mandate
given to the UN and its agencies is well defined. The second, even where such a
mandate is clearly defined, the UN and its agencies may not have the financial
wherewithal to execute this. What the first calls for, is a clear division of labour among
international institutions, and, the second, a change of heart by countries in the north
about their role in the UN. As governments have cut their ODA contributions in the
advent of increased private flows, they have also reduced their support for multilateral
funding agencies like the UN. In particular, the UNDP has been quite hamstrung by this
development in recent years. A few governments like the US, France, Germany and
Japan have cut their contributions to this agency. The voluntary contributions fell from
US$ 1,178 million in 1992 to about US$ 750 million in 1998.Voluntary funds have also
been cut in the case of other UN and other regional development agencies, including
UNICEF and UNIDO, while budgets based on assessments have been cut back as well
in other agencies such as the WHO and ILO. The UN core budget supporting the UN
secretariat and intergovernmental negotiation has also suffered severe cuts in recent
years with attendant negative consequences for multilateral development and planning.
4 A review of proffered solutions to the institutional problems
A number of solutions have been proffered towards resolving some of the institutional
issues raised in section 3 with the view to improving the volume and effectiveness of
development assistance to needy countries. Some of these proposals are radical, others
bordering on the eccentric. For example, Kanbur and Sander (1999) have suggested
what they called the ‘common pool’ to which donors are to contribute and from which
disbursements are to be made to recipients, without regard to donor’s self-interests.
Others have concentrated on how to revamp and strengthen the multilateral
development finance institutions such as the MDBs (You 2002; Eccles and Gwin 1999).
Among the most recent and most controversial are those by Klein (1998) and Meltzer
(2000). This section attempts to review some of these suggestions. The treatment is in
two distinct but interrelated parts. First we consider suggestions that deal with the aid
delivery process. The second set of reforms focuses on the suggestions that have been
made with regard to enhancing the performance of these institutions so as to increase
the volume of aid.
4.1 Measures aimed at improving on the effectiveness of aid delivery
The central preoccupation of these measures is to address the issue of ownership of the
aid process. Earlier, we argued that the lack of ownership has constrained the15
effectiveness of aid delivery to many recipient countries. In order to address this, a
number of suggestions have been made to involve recipient countries in the design and
implementation of projects. Among these are the ‘common pool’ approach, the
‘sector-wide approach’, the ‘comprehensive development framework’ (CDF), and the
HIPC Initiative.
4.1.1 The sector-wide approach to development aid
This approach can be viewed as a precursor to the comprehensive development
framework and the common pool approach. The underlying factors in this approach are:
(i) the realisation that individual projects standing on their own may have limited impact
where there is no adequate sectoral policy and (ii) even where there is adequate sectoral
policy, donors have come to accept the fact that policymakers in developing countries
may have difficulties coordinating the different projects on-going at the same time and
thus be unable to determine the impact of the totality of activities in a particular sector
at any point in time(Kanbur et al. 1999).
Some of the elements of the sector-wide approach include:
−   First, the recipient country comes up with its overall strategy for the sector and
donors sign on to support the strategy;
−   National governments are encouraged to co-fund such sectoral strategies once
identified and considered in line with national development goals;
−   The approach rests on a basket funding system where donors do not provide funds
to specific projects but for a sector within which many projects could be
undertaken by implementers; and
−   As they design their own sectoral strategy and devolve much of the activities to
lower levels of responsibility, policymakers create an atmosphere of inclusion and
this will spin off into more positive achievement.
The sector-wide approach has been widely used in the health sector by the WB in
Africa, particularly in Zambia (1993-97) and Ghana (1996). One major shortcoming of
the sector-wide approach is the inability to ensure country ownership of donor funds.
Funds are not necessarily allocated through the sectoral pool, although donors accept a
uniform arrangement for accounting, budgeting, progress reporting, etc. The reason for
this is simple. Donors are not very confident of the local capacity in financial control
and reporting in recipient countries. The result is that while government ministries take
control of their sectoral programmes, donors implement the strategy largely on their
own. Nevertheless, the reported success rates in Zambia and Ghana testify to the fact
that the SIP did provide a solution to a certain degree to the problem of ownership and
coordination.
4.2.2 Partnership approach to development aid: the comprehensive development
framework
The need to adopt a broader and more inclusive approach to aid delivery spurred the
move to national development strategies. Like the sector approach, the partnership
arrangement is designed by the country and then supported by donors. The idea of a
partnership can be traced to Pearson (1969), though this has now become widely16
embraced by the UNDP, OECD and other development agencies. Currently, the most
widely discussed is the World Bank’s partnership effort (World Bank 1998). The paper
gave birth to the CDF as a further step for tackling the problem of coordination in
partnership arrangements.
Schematically, the partnership proposal outlines three stages in aid delivery:9
i)  The recipient country evaluates its needs and on the basis of this prepares a
national development strategy after interacting with the private sector, civil
society and other stakeholders. The practice enables recipient countries to build
a consensus on development focus through debate and dialogue. A national
development strategy is then designed based on the needs articulated;
ii)  A financing mechanism is then planned for the strategy. This is done by
convening a meeting of the ‘development partners coalition’ consisting of
donors and recipients in the recipient country’s capital. Two objectives are
served by this meeting. First, in line with the recipient country’s strategy,
donors design their individual action plans and make their pledges. Second,
donors utilize the opportunity to coordinate their assistance strategies through
the formation of ‘partnership frameworks’. In forming such frameworks,
individual donors exploit their comparative advantages in the recipient
country’s programme and also discover areas of possible collaboration with
other donors; and
iii)  Finally, based on an understanding of their relative efficiencies, donors
institute a common arrangement for the implementation, monitoring and
assessment of the projects.
Though the process provides a nucleus for the distilling of national consensus between
donors and recipient county, donors, based on their identified comparative advantages,
will still continue to select specific projects from the national strategy for funding. This
still creates a problem for coordination and monitoring. In an attempt to resolve this, the
World Bank in 1999 proposed the CDF.
The CDF encompasses most of the ideas in the partnership document. In principle, it
recognizes the need for recipient countries to own their development strategies. Some of
the key elements of the CDF include (i) country ownership of the policy agenda;
(ii) partnership with all stakeholders; (iii) taking a long-term comprehensive approach
built on national consultations, and (iv) treating social and structural concerns equally as
macroeconomic and financial concerns.10
One interesting aspect of the CDF, which is designed to help resolve the problem of
coordination, is the use of the CDF matrix. The matrix is supposed to assist with the
organization of a country-focussed programme by ‘capturing the strategic priorities of
the country, as well as who is doing what and where’.11 The matrix represents, at any
point in time, a visual impression of the development assistance in any given country.
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As useful as the tool is, it has generated its own problems. The question remains as to
who draws up the matrix—the WB or recipient country? If it is the WB, will the country
be in charge of the process? Which donors will help the most? The fear here is that the
process might still be donor- or WB-driven.
One other aspect of the CDF that is of interest here is the issue of consultations and
partnership-building with other actors in the development arena. For instance, the Bank
has established key focal points for the purpose of consulting on CDF implementation
and related issues. Such focal points include bilateral arrangements with the DAC,
OECD, and such other country groupings like the Nordic group; the UN focal point and
the multilateral focal points comprising of organizations currently engaged in different
pilot activities in recipient countries. Each of these focal group provides the Bank with
feedback on progress on the ground and the effectiveness of the working arrangements.
The CDF, like the sectoral strategy, falls short of providing a means through which the
burden of individual donor projects can be alleviated. Donors still decide what specific
projects they will fund, though, as part of the comprehensive country framework. The
other problem is the issue of capacity. Capacity-building is an important ingredient for
country ownership. This will remain a challenge for many recipient countries for many
years to come. The next approach attempts to tackle the first of these problems.
4.2.3 The common pool approach to development assistance12
A major constraint on the effectiveness of aid identified earlier is the lack of ownership
of development projects financing. To reiterate, donors have their own perspectives
which determine the programmes they are willing to finance. Recipient countries have
to contend with their unique histories, political economies and ideas on development
strategies, which influence their behaviour. In the words of the proponents of this
approach, there is an ‘agency problem’. Principals in this case donors use ‘sticks and
carrots’ to induce agents to undertake a specific course of action. Examples of such
methods are the imposition of conditionalities on policy reform and standardized
reporting requirements. The end result is a collection of highly variegated aid delivery
systems within a country with the attendant costs to recipients. This tends to undermine
ownership of the programme in recipient countries.
The common pool approach is supposed to work as follows:
−   Recipient country develops its own strategy, programmes and projects in
consultation with its constituency and dialogue with donors;
−   Presents plan to donors. Donors will be expected to put unrestricted financing into
a common pool;
−   Recipient governments would also contribute to this common pool;
−   The level of financing by each donor would depend on its own assessment both of
the strategy and the programme and also the recipient country’s ability to
implement the strategy and effectively coordinate project and outlays;
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−   Donors funds will not be allocated to specific items, neither will donors be allowed
to monitor specific projects or items therein; and
−   This common pool will be expected to finance the overall development strategy.
The common pool approach will ensure ownership, allow for mutual resolution of
differences of opinions in the development process and tackle the problem of aid
coordination. Because recipient countries will now have the responsibility for
formulating and implementing development strategies, ownership will increase and
implementation will be more effective. Kanbur et al. (1999) recognize the fact that in
the short run, the volume of aid might fall. They, however, contend that such a drop-off
can be planned for and the available volume of aid can be more effectively utilized. In
the medium to long run, the efficient utilization of the aid available in the short run will
present a basis for arguing for more aid. On the part of donors, the approach will reduce
the need for staff to develop, monitor and evaluate individual projects, or to monitor
compliance with conditions.
4.2.4 Debt relief as development aid: HIPC Initiative
The HIPC Initiative was launched in 1996, to serve as a framework for negotiations and
for the provision of debt relief to debt-burdened developing countries. As conceived
originally, eligible countries went through two stages of three years each to qualify for
debt relief. In the first stage, the country is required to establish a track record of good
performance in the implementation of an economic reform programme under the
enhanced structural adjustment facility of the IMF. In return, its Paris Club creditors
would commit themselves to rescheduling debt service payments so as to achieve
roughly a 67 per cent reduction in the net present value (NPV) of eligible debt, while
non-Paris Club members would provide comparable relief. On completion of the first
stage, the country is supposed to pass a decision test. At this point, it is decided if the
country would qualify for an HIPC debt relief if the Naples  terms’ reduction it had
obtained did not exert any noticeable impact in reducing its debt stock to a sustainable
level. During the second stage, the Paris Club creditors would provide additional debt
service relief up to 80 per cent in NPV terms (Lyon terms). The non-Paris Club
members will also provide relief. At the end of the second three-year stage, a
‘completion point’ is reached when the creditors would reduce the country's debt burden
to a sustainable level, implying up to 80 per cent stock relief in NPV terms.
There were misgivings about the extent of debt relief and its sustainability under the
original HIPC Initiative. Also a number of questions were raised as to the wisdom of
waiting until the completion point before debt relief is granted. The Cologne Initiative
(1999) sought to effect changes in the original scheme in at least four ways: (i) by
accelerating the pace of debt relief through the provision of interim relief before the
‘completion point’; (ii) by allowing countries to advance the ‘completion point’ by
accelerating the pace of policy reforms; (iii) by broadening country eligibility through
changes in the sustainability thresholds, and (iv) the Cologne Initiative also sought to
link debt relief to poverty alleviation (Botchwey 1998).
4.2.4.1 Problems with the Initiative
The HIPC Initiative suffers from a number of shortcomings. From the perspective of the
creditors, there are anxieties about finding resources to meet the additional financing
required to meet the enhanced initiative which is estimated to have grown from19
US$ 12.5 billion to US$ 29.3 billion. The bilateral and commercial creditors will bear
nearly half of this cost, leaving the multilateral development banks (including the WB)
with about 41.8 per cent and the IMF about 8.1 per cent.
Generally, there are pitfalls in the arrangement. First, it is feared that the criterion for
determining the ability of the HIPCs to pay their debts is inappropriate. Fiscal position,
rather than the ratio of debts-to-exports, is a better reflection of a country’s ability to
pay its debt. The arrangement assumes that all exports proceeds accrue to the treasury
and debt service payments are made there from. Second, the programme misses the fact
that these countries need large transfers from the rest of the world and that, for the most
part, they pay their debts at the expense of investments in physical infrastructure and
human capital; and third, the current mechanisms for easing the debt burdens of these
countries leave them with marginally positive net resource flows that are grossly
inadequate to meet urgent social expenditures.
4.2.4.2Resolving the international debt crisis: the insolvency and bankruptcy
processing of sovereign debt
In view of the numerous problems encountered with the HIPC Initiative, various
suggestions have been made towards resolving the international debt crises. One of such
initiatives the insolvency and bankruptcy proceeding of sovereign debtor championed
by the Jubilee 2000 organization.13 The Jubilee Framework for international insolvency
consists essentially of three elements.14 First, a sovereign debtor should be able to
determine at what point repayment of foreign debts is being made at a cost to human
rights or dignity of the people of that country. Where debt reduction proves
unattainable, the country should be able to file for a ‘standstill’ on debt repayments
through an unconditional right to petition. The second step involves the country seeking
protection from creditors in an insolvency court. A number of controversies still
surround the mode and composition of the insolvency court but one thing that is
emerging from the debate is the need to sequester the IMF from this role. It is strongly
felt that an independent panel/arbitration court made up of equal numbers of nominees
from both the debtor country and representatives of international creditors be put in
place to perform this role.
Finally, the court will be charged with certain responsibilities, prominent among which
are (i) determining whether sovereign debts were legally and properly contracted;
(ii) ensuring a public debate of outstanding portfolio of debts through the involvement
of civil society and (iii) checking whether, as has often happened in many countries in
the past, private debts contracted without the knowledge of central governments have
been retroactively ‘nationalized’. Other functions of the court will include ensuring that
(i) creditors are treated symmetrically (creditors like the WB and IMF are not given
preferential treatment); (ii) preventing capital flight from debtor countries, and
(iii) protecting the human rights of citizens of the sovereign debtor. The underlining
principle in the framework is the involvement of the people in a debtor country in crisis
that impacts directly on the quality of their lives.
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4.3 Institutional reforms measures
The reform of institutions delivering aid is considered crucial from the point of view of
increasing the effectiveness and volume of aid. The institutions considered in this




The sustenance of the UN agencies—most of which are partly financed by members’
assessed contributions and voluntary contributions—is relevant to the development
financing issue. The major handicap the UN faces in financing its development goals is
the fact that member nations are in arrears in their contributions to the annual support of
the UN.15 Thus, the system now faces a dwindling resource base. Although the Charter
of the UN states that, ‘the expenses of the organization shall be borne by the Members
as apportioned by the General Assembly’, the Charter does not provide for any
distinctive guidelines on the principles of apportionment. A number of suggestions have
been made on how to apportion the total budget of the UN to its members. One of the
most recent is the Burden sharing approach popularized by Klein.16 The approach rests
on some basic principles for apportioning the budget of the Secretariat of the UN among
members.17 Some of these principles include:
i)  Assessment should be based on the ability to pay: this simply implies that the
larger and more prosperous countries should bear a larger part of the burden.
The richer the country, the more it should pay;
ii)  Progressivity of the assessment: progressivity means that as one moves up the
income scale the ratio of incremental assessments to incremental income
should rise across countries. In other words, the marginal assessment should be
an increasing function of the per capita income levels;
iii)  Horizontal equity: fairness demands that people or countries at the same per
capita income level should have the same per capita assessment, and
iv)  Transparency: this means that the rule of assessment should be simple,
understandable to all, and formulated in terms of available data and objective.
The beauty of the approach recommended is that by playing around the equations
devised to tackle each of these criteria, exemptions can be made for special cases on the
basis of debt burden, ecological disasters such as drought, income inequality, or some
other aspects of poverty. A hypothetical calculation by the authors based on figures for
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17 The emphasis of the approach is on the Secretariat because most UN agencies have different
methods/sources of raising finances for their operations.21
1993 shows that the 31 industrial countries at a high level of human development index
(HDI) would bear more than 90 per cent of total UN financial burden.
4.3.1.2 Independent financing
The advocates of independent financing would base their argument precisely on the
undesirable outcome of the Burden sharing arrangement. At the heart of the reform of
the UN system is the need to free the finances of the organization from domination by a
few rich countries. The argument here is that UN funding should be separated to some
extent from government contributions. Various recommendations have been made on
alternative modes of financing. Many of these involve the levy of international taxes
such as the Tobin tax, the carbon tax, tax on aviation fuel, and tax on arms trade.18
International taxes serve a dual role. They could be used to finance development.19 In
addition, they could be a veritable source for the provision of global public goods.
Debates on these taxes still span such issues as coverage, the base for the tax, tax rate,
equity and efficiency. As appealing as these taxes look, there is strong opposition to
them by the affected business interests. For instance, the major international banks are
strongly opposed to the Tobin tax and oil companies are opposed to the carbon tax.
There is also resistance on the part of governments who are afraid of losing tax as a
symbol of national authority to a supranational taxing power. The US Congress has
passed a law forbidding the UN from even considering global tax measures. The
resistance to these forms of financing goes beyond the issue of money or national tax
autonomy. The real issue here is political (Falk 2002). The introduction of these taxes
will mean that the powerful nations will be gradually loosing their grip over the less
developed countries, a development they will not countenance.
4.3.2 Reforming the Bretton Woods institutions
The need to reform the principal Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) has
been the subject of many recent debates. The ideas covered here relate mainly to
reforms aimed at enhancing the flow of development aid to developing countries. These
reforms have revolved around three major pillars: (i) reforming the governance of these
institutions; (ii) the issue of conditionality, and (iii) defining the role of these institutions
vis-à-vis other multilateral institutions.
4.3.2.1 Reforming the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions
A number of proposals have been made for the reform of the governance structure of
the Bretton Woods institutions.20 Here we attempt to summarize some of the main
ideas:
i)  The two institutions should devise ways of becoming more inclusive. In
particular, the interests of developing countries must be taken into
consideration in constituting the decisionmaking apparatus of the institutions.
Specifically, it has been suggested that the Interim Committee and the
Development Committee of the IMF which are currently just ceremonial
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advisory agents be transformed into decisionmaking bodies with better
representation of the developing and transition economies;
ii)  Accountability and transparency should be strengthened. The idea here is to
ensure that the governance and accounting structure of the institutions provide
accurate information about their activities. In particular, decision by consensus
should be replaced with open discussions and voting procedures (You 2002;
Woods 1998). The officials of the institutions should be accountable for their
actions, and reports should be made available and written in an understandable
manner. When programmes fail, staff in charge should be held responsible.
External evaluation should be strengthened and representatives from different
countries should be included in all appraisal teams; and
iii)  Democratic processes and sovereign authority must be respected especially in
borrowing countries.
4.3.2.2 Conditionality
The practice of imposing conditionality was discussed earlier. To reiterate, imposing the
same conditions on all countries irrespective of the structural problems underlying the
balance of payments crises is, to say the least, improper. Second, conditionalities have
expanded into areas that have no direct bearing on loan repayment thus infringing on
national sovereignty (Collier and Gunning 1999). Third, conditionality may preclude the
ownership of development programmes and projects. Finally, conditionality has been
found to be generally not as effective for changing the policies of recipient countries or
for improving economic performance.
A number of suggestions have been made by scholars with regard to the issue of
conditionality (You 2002). These include (i) making conditionalities simpler and
penalties stiffer for countries that quit (Mosley et al. 1995; Hills, Peterson and Goldstein
1999), (ii) having countries formulate their economic reform programmes, and
(iii) making  conditionality  ex-post.  The  overriding objective should be to improve
ownership of programmes. Simpler terms may reduce but not eliminate the ownership
issue. Having countries formulate their own programme is already at practice with the
WB but governments must be committed to reforms and the input of the Bretton Woods
institutions should be minimal. By far the issue of ex-post conditionality seems best.
institutions should be provided with financing once it is ascertained that good policies
are in place without requiring conditionalities.
The use of institutional reform loans as an incentive to get countries to continue long-
term reform programmes is strongly advocated by the Meltzer Report. The proposal
involves the appointment of a third independent party to verify or certify whether
conditionality has been complied with or not. Up till now, this has been the sole
prerogative of unilateral determination by the lender. This will serve a dual purpose. It
will help reduce the time inconsistency problem associated with conditionality whereby
countries renege on the conditions agreed on after obtaining loans. Second, it will
promote steady implementation since such loans will serve as incentive to sustain
reform till the end.21
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4.3.2.3 Defining the roles of the institutions22
The objective under this reform is to strictly define the activities that each institution
should be involved in. For the IMF, the following roles have been suggested:
i)  IMF should serve only as a quasi lender of last resort to emerging economies
Its activities should be tailored towards the provision of short-term (maximum
of 120 days) liquidity assistance to countries;
ii)  Thus IMF ‘should cease to make other types of loans especially long-term
loans requiring unending conditionalities to countries. In this regard, any long
term institutional assistance to foster development and encourage sound
economic policies should be the responsibility of the WB or regional
development Banks’ (Meltzer 2000). In this way, the IMF Growth and Poverty
Facility is an over-extension;
iii)  IMF should continue to act as a knowledge institution by collecting and
publishing financial and economic data from member countries and
disseminating such data in a timely and uniform manner.
iv)  It should also continue to provide policy advice. The medium through which it
currently does this, the Article IV Consultations, should be improved for
transparency and dialogue; and
v)  In connection with (ii) and (iii) it is also suggested that the IMF decentralize its
research activities which are currently concentrated at the headquarters of the
Fund. This will help to enlist ownership and involvement of the people.
4.3.3 Multilateral development banks
Although MDBs have a number of functions, their financial mobilization role for the
poor and needy countries will continue to attract the largest resources. The focus of the
development banks should be to target those poorest countries without access to
private–sector resources with the objective of reducing poverty. The MDBs should
continue to mobilize concessional loans for the poor countries through their soft loans
windows.
The World Bank should revert fully to its development role. The WB needs to increase
the focus of its efforts on the IDA countries and the provision of public goods that
currently does not seem to attract private investors. Promoting investment in health and
education, infrastructure development, and poverty eradication must continue to attract
the attention of the WB. To do this, following reforms have been suggested:
−   The WB should move away from loans to a greater emphasis on grants. Loans for
social investment in ‘good policy’ countries may be of some use but in poor
countries, it only leads to further immersion into poverty. In this regard,
performance based grants should replace loans. Independent agents to ensure that
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aid is targeted at effective poverty reduction programmes should audit
performance;23
−   The WB must continue to be a knowledge institution. This has been extensively
discussed earlier. The WB must continue to assist with the development of the
skills necessary for the implementation of projects, and offer policy advice;
−   A more defined role between the WB and the IMF is long overdue. The IMF
should focus on short-term and systemic problems (financial stability) and the
Bank on the long-term development needs of poor countries. The argument here is
that issues of international finance are closely linked to the interests of rich and
powerful countries while development needs are strictly not. The Bank, therefore,
should not devote its lean resources to such preoccupation (You 2002). For
instance, the Bank’s approval of the emergency structural adjustment lending
procedure whereby it allocates funds to supplement IMF financing during crises is
highly suspicious. There will always be cooperation between the two institutions.
For instance, the WB will continue to stress the role of social policy as an integral
part of the new financial system. Also, the Bank will need to continue to harp on
the social dimensions of adjustment by providing technical assistance in required
areas such as financial restructuring.
−   There is need for clear demarcation of roles between the WB and other multilateral
(regional) development banks. Regional development banks compete for donor
funds, clients and projects with the WB. The organizational structure of the WB
with emphasis on subsidized loans and guarantees to governments, zero-interest
credit to the poorest members, and loans, guarantees and equity capital for private
sector operations is duplicated by the development banks. The WB chooses to
expand offices even at country levels when what is needed is closer coordination
with regional development bank offices, given the impression of competition
rather than cooperation. These may need to be sorted out to enable the WB
perform its role.
−   There is need for coordination of the roles between the WB and UN agencies,
particularly in the areas of the supply of public goods and elimination of public
bads.
5 Recommendations and conclusion
The suggestion of solutions or reform measures is a difficult task that requires the
concerted efforts of seasoned international policymakers. Therefore, what is attempted
here is, at best, a ‘first shot’ towards this end. Most of our discussions so far have
focused on who is doing what as far as development financing is concerned. In this
section we are more concerned with distilling these alternatives into an ‘integrated and
harmonious’ reform policy package. Central to the reform measures proposed here is
the understanding that any global finance package should have as its core the ability to
lift the living standards of people, particularly in developing countries.
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Five broad considerations form the core of an institutional reform package. These are:
i)  The global governance issue;
ii)  Restructuring the financial system to achieve a network for effective
operations;
iii)  The role of the domestic financial system in the emerging structure;
iv)  ODA versus private capital flows and their implications for institutional
reform; and
v)  Dealing with global goods and bads.
5.1 The global governance issue
The issue of governance permeates different operational areas of these institutions.
There are two related concerns here. The first has to do with equity. The major
shareholders in these institutions, i.e. the advanced, industrial nations (also the lending
nations) are over-represented in the decisionmaking apparatus of the supranational
bodies, leaving the borrowing countries without voice. Inadequate representation
constitutes a problem in many respects. It limits the legitimacy of international financial
arrangements. Second, it limits ownership of programmes. Third, to the extent that
growth in developing countries can have systemic impacts, inadequate participation and
hence commitment could engender greater vulnerability and retard world economic
growth. Thus, this continues to be at the heart of the cry for the reform of these
institutions.
The second issue is the compelling need for an international global financial institution
that is able to impose common standards and codes that will be binding. The need for
such a body derives first from the nature of capital flows. The Asian, Mexican and
Russian financial crises have demonstrated the risks that financial crisis in any part of
the world can create for the global financial system. And as shown by past experience,
developing countries financial system are even more prone to risk when such crisis
occur, as was evidenced by the fall in development assistance at the peak of the Asian
crisis. The absence of developing countries in the Basle Committee on banking
supervision, and their insufficient participation in the BIS are clear examples of the
exclusion of these countries from the forums where crucial issues that affect them are
discussed. This does not portend well, especially since the developing countries are
expected to accede to decisions reached at these forums.
Thus, a critical issue is the need to increase developing country participation in the
institutions where they already are represented but inadequately so. For instance, at the
IMF, the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) and the development
committee as well as the boards of the IMF and WB have a voting power which gives
many developing countries inadequate representation (Ocampo 2002). The need to
reform the out-dated quota system of the IMF has also been mooted in many
discussions. Reform measures such as the restoration of basic votes, and the use of
purchasing power parity (PPP)-based GDP estimates to correct the under-representation
of developing countries are under discussion.26
In addition to the reform of existing institutions, the proposal for the creation of a global
council at the highest political level to provide leadership on issues on global
governance has been on the table since 1995.24 This council will have a broader base
than the G7 or G10 or G20 or the Bretton Woods institutions, and although without
legal authority, the council will be expected to provide political leadership and give
direction on policy framework to promote development, ensure consistency in the
policy goals of the major international organizations and promote consensus building
among governments on issues of global economic and social governance (Zedillo 2000).
5.2 Restructuring the financial system to achieve a network for effective
operations
The need for strong regional institutions and their effective linkage to existing
international financial institutions to form an effective network for financial services
cannot be over-emphasized. The role of regional financial institutions spans several
areas. With the commitment to regional integration, there has been a blossoming of
regional trade and regional capital market integration. Also, globalization has enhanced
the growth of regional macroeconomic interaction. It also follows that certain functions
such as surveillance of and consultations on macroeconomic policies, and peer review
of national systems of prudential regulations and supervision are better performed at a
regional level. Other support for the primacy of regional institutions include the
risk-pooling argument, competition especially in the supply of services to smaller and
medium-sized economies, and the sense of ownership that creates a special relationship
between financial institutions and member countries. The federalist argument also lends
support to enhancing the role of regional institutions. No matter what effort is put into
reforming the existing supranational institutions, it is doubtful if the voice of the small-
and medium-sized countries will ever be felt in these institutions. Thus, the small
country, within a global order, stands a chance of being heard only when it is part of a
regional block.
These arguments have been demonstrated in the effectiveness of such regional
arrangements like the European Payments Union, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Asean
Surveillance process and in recent times the Andrean Development Corporation. An
arrangement whereby the IMF is at the apex of a network of regional and sub-regional
financial transactions fanning out in a network is likely to be more effective in
guaranteeing competition than the current centralized arrangement. Under the current
dispensation, institutions are highly specialized. Such an arrangement may be better
suited to providing services that cannot be sufficiently provided by any one institution.
Second, it may be more balanced than a system based on a few world organizations
(Ocampo 2002). This suggestion is very controversial because, as has been argued thus
far, it may lead to some duplication of roles.
5.3 Domestic financial markets and the mobilization of resources for development
finance
The reform of domestic financial markets and, in particular capital markets, is crucial
for any successful domestic resource mobilization. The reform of domestic capital
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markets is central to the issue of attracting private capital flows. One of the greatest
problems—and a common source of high borrowing costs—in many developing
economies is the absence a of a virile capital market. However, private capital flows, as
desirable as they are, can create their own problems because of their volatile nature. A
basic lesson from the Asian crisis is that satisfying prudential requirements may not
provide enough protection against sudden capital flows. Thus, the starting point for
developing countries in solving their developmental finance requirement is to put in
place measures, including financial systems that are adequate for successful domestic
resource mobilization.
5.4 Official development assistance (ODA) versus private capital flows
to developing countries
The declining trend in ODA flows to developing countries is a matter of concern. ODA
was a major source of development finance to many developing countries until the
1980s, accounting for about half of total resource flows. However, beginning from
1991, this trend has been reversed, with this source of financing now accounting for
only about 20 per cent of total. It is necessary to stress here that despite the general
decline in official flows to developing countries, ODA grants have stayed relatively
constant at around US$ 40 billion. Official loans, on the other hand, have fallen from
US$ 27 billion to about US$ 9 billion during the last decade. Also, the proportion of
ODA allocated to emergency and relief work as well as the administration of aid
programmes has increased over the years even as aggregate ODA has fallen.
These findings have implications for institutional reform. First, MDBs must reposition
themselves to be able to continue to mobilize concessional loans for the poor
developing countries. A possible scenario for the future is that the total volume of ODA
through bilateral and multilateral channels might remain at current levels in nominal
terms. To be able to reach the poverty reduction targets set for the immediate future,
donors may have to utilize the soft loan window of the MDBs. This can only happen if
bilateral donor countries see MDBs as adding value and demonstrating a relatively
strong comparative advantage in development effectiveness (Swedish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2000). Once these conditions are satisfied, donor agencies will prefer to
channel funding through MDBs rather than channelling such funds through their own
bilateral agencies and incurring additional costs. The need for recipient countries to take
ownership of such programmes/projects cannot be over-emphasized. This is why MDBs
must fine tune the methods through which they provide concessional finance to
borrowers. The current approaches being experimented upon, i.e. the common pool and
the CDF may need to be perfected.
The other related issue is with regard to the growing allocation of ODA to emergency
and relief work and administration. Granted that ODA flows are declining, if MDBs as
part of their public-goods function decide to continue to finance this item, who pays for
this? Two sources are immediately discernible. Either MDB borrowers could be made
to pay higher loan charges or shareholders could contribute through higher levels of
paid-in capital. Neither of these options is equitable for public goods. Moreover it is
doubtful if MDBs would want to continue to subsidize the provision of such goods
through transfers from their net income. This also introduced a larger issue. Should
MDBs be involved in the provision of public goods? This raises the question of the
division of labour between UN agencies which are better suited for this purpose and28
MDBs whose activities should be restricted mainly to the financing role and
peripherally to the knowledge-broker role but not the provision of public goods!
The flow of private capital to developing countries since the beginning of the last
decade has elicited a lot of euphoria. The ecstasy derives from the assumption that this
could compensate for the dwindling inflows of ODA. The sub-component of private
capital flows that has witnessed the greatest upsurge is FDI. This development has
fuelled the belief that the development financing needs of developing countries could be
met by a reliance on the markets. There are a number of concerns with this
development.
−   Private investment will always target profit-oriented projects. It will not finance
projects in the environment or other social concerns, though it has the potential to
finance sustainable development. To depend on investors in the north to finance
sustainable development projects in the south is expecting too much. This has
nothing to do with sentiment. Not many private investors in the south will be
expected to finance non-profit oriented projects.
−   Private investment so far has been concentrated in a few mineral and oil producing
nations. In Africa, a substantial part of private capital flows to the continent is
absorbed by South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt. Other emerging market economies
that have benefited from this upsurge are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China,
Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand and Venezuela. Most poor nations in Africa have not
benefited from the new source of financing that is supposed to supplant ODA.
Factors that are listed as the main determinants of FDI inflows such as the policy
environment, high growth rates, low transaction costs, and market size, are not
very common in these low-income countries.
−   Private investment is highly speculative and very volatile. The extent to which they
can be relied upon for long-term investment, particularly in an environment that
does not have a long history of political and economic stability, is highly
doubtful.25
−   The record of private investment, particularly in developing countries where there
are no environmental or social legislation whether it is Shell in Nigeria, Mitsubishi
in Indonesia, or Nike in Vietnam, leaves much to be desired.
What does this mean in terms of development finance? First, it goes to show that private
capital flows cannot be relied upon for the purpose of sustainable development in the
least developed countries. The role of capital investment in the social sector—
institutional, development, capacity building and knowledge-brokering, areas which the
private sector will hardly go into—continues to justify the need for MDBs and
concessional lending. Second, given the current state of capital markets development in
many of the poor countries, ODA flows will continue to be a more dependable source of
development financing in the foreseeable future.
Third, given the nature of the volatile and speculative movements alluded to earlier, it is
necessary to put clear rules in place for international capital flows to protect the
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economies of the many of these developing countries from these adverse capital flows.
Many efforts are geared towards liberalizing capital flows and less on how to deal with
any adverse consequences. Developed industrial nations are better able to deal with
sudden capital movements. The IMF, as the institution charged with the
balance-of-payments problems in developing countries, should enact policies to deal
with this. Its bail out-operations in Mexico and Asia have attracted a lot of criticism. As
long as the world’s nations fail to adopt internationally agreed environmental and social
standards, private foreign investment will remain a major cause of environmental
degradation. The role of the UN in this area needs to be beefed up.
Finally, the role of private capital flows is often discussed in many policy papers
without paying enough attention to the myriad of SMEs in many developing countries,
FDI inflows focus more on transnational corporations. Yet the future path for growth
and employment in many developing countries hang on SMEs. Efforts at reaching this
segment of the market through MDBs have been very poor so far. The EIB loans
targeting many of these companies have been a very poor case of the mode of delivery
of development finance. In recent times, the IFC has also increased its efforts at
reaching out to SMEs. During the period 1999-2001, SME-related lending by the IFC
increased from US$ 1.5 billion to about US$ 2 billion, representing about 13 and 20 per
cent, respectively, of their sectorwide investment for the period. Most of this is
disbursed through financial intermediaries, especially commercial banks. But this in
itself is a contradiction of some sorts and shows a lack of coordination in multilateral
development bank lending. First, commercial banks by their very nature are not suited
to long-term lending in many developing countries. Second, commercial banks have a
problem handling out their own loans in many developing countries. So more often than
not, they find MDB loans competing with their own lending operations. One then
wonders why a more efficient network of lending cannot be established with the apex
MDB, the World Bank, at the top going through regional MDBs and finally national
development banks or similar investment institutions. The practice has been to cast
aspersion on national development banks rather than reform them. Such criticism of
national development banks is quick to point to the failure of such institutions in many
developing countries in the past, justifiably of course. But the success of national
development banks in Asia and South Africa which has been quite effective in the old
Southern Africa should provide a challenge for policymakers in the study of these
institutions. It is to expect too much when commercial banks are relied upon at the
national level to perform the functions of a development bank. Development banks,
whether at national, regional or global level, are unique in their function and distinct
from commercial banks.
5.5 Public goods and bads
The issue of public goods and bads is gaining increasing prominence in public
discourse. Globalization has not helped matters. The process of globalization is
diminishing the power of sovereign governments, yet, there is no corresponding
increase at the international level in the power of a supranational organization to
regulate this market-driven process. In the absence of a super body to impose restraint,
the fear is genuine that the world is likely to end up with a retinue of public bads such as
environmental degradation, epidemics, arms trade and drug trafficking. Specialized UN
agencies already exist to handle these issues. For example, the WTO, IMF, UNCTAD
and the regional Economic Commissions of the UN are better positioned to handle some30
of the issues pertaining to trade and finance related development issues than the MDBs.
The WHO (health), UNAIDS (aids pandemic), UNFPA (population) and a host of
others are specialized in their different areas of services delivery. In terms of division of
labour, the MDBs do not have any business getting involved in these areas if the UN
system is well-funded.
The UN was founded on certain basic principles and common understanding among all
nations—to foster world peace and bridge both the north-south and the east-west divide.
More than ever before, international life is becoming more complex and it is becoming
increasingly impossible to get nations to act where their personal interests are not at
risk. The need to build consensus rather than impose rules is more in demand than ever
before. These principles make the UN a more relevant institution when it comes to
issues like human rights, environment, health, labour and global economic policy.
What is called for is a strengthening of the UN system both politically (governance) and
financially to enable it to perform its development role. Politically, the decisionmaking
apparatus of the UN needs to be restructured to guarantee adequate representation. In
terms of funding, a supranational body that would command respect must be financially
viable and independent. This has been the basis of our suggestion on the need to pursue
a mechanism for securing some independent sources of funding for the UN system. The
debate on the use of international taxes, that has been put on hold for some time, needs
to be revisited.
We have attempted in this work to examine the main institutional issues involved in the
delivery of development finance to developing countries. The debate on the reform of
the international financial architecture has not come out very strongly in this area, at
least not as forceful as it has been on the issue of the stability of the financial system.
Aid will remain a major source of financing development in many developing countries
where low domestic resource mobilization, weak institutional structures, low incomes
and abysmal poverty have increased, even as we enter the new millennium. The
increase in the spate of globalization, environmental degradation, and the surge in
epidemics will only compound the existing inequality between the north and the south
and create further threats to world peace if necessary policy actions are not initiated.
Private capital flows will not be enough to address these developmental concerns.
To enhance the effectiveness of existing institutions, especially development finance
institutions, there is need to re-define their roles to enhance their ability to mobilize and
channel aid to areas where they are required the most. Second, we examined the existing
division of labour among these institutions and concluded that a lot of overlap currently
exists. To avoid confusion in the delivery of aid and ensure efficiency, we
recommended basic guidelines that should determine ‘who does what’. This, in addition
to improving efficiency, will remove the problem of aid coordination and economize on
scarce resources.31
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